After Lehman's collapse, investors ran from risky money market funds. In 27 of them, outflows overwhelmed cash inflows, thus forcing asset sales. These funds sold their safest and most liquid holdings. Funds were thus left with riskier and longer maturity assets. Over the subsequent quarter, however, the hard-hit funds reduced risk more than other funds. In contrast, money funds hit by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks before Lehman did not alter portfolio risk. The result suggests that moral hazard concerns with the Treasury Guarantee of investor claims did not increase risk taking. Funds that benefitted most from the government bailout reduced risk.
I. Introduction
This paper studies how money market fund portfolios changed after the run that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. We focus on how money funds met withdrawal demands through portfolio reallocations in both the short run and the long run.
Funds hardest hit by investor runs reacted initially by meeting withdrawal demands with cash generated from maturing assets and by selling off the safest and most liquid holdings. As a result, immediately after the run ended, hard-hit funds had increased portfolio risk and lengthened asset maturity relative to other funds. By the end of 2008, however, these hard-hit funds had reallocated their investments toward safer and shorter-term investments than what they had held on the eve of the crisis. This announcement initiated a run across the money market industry, whereby institutional investors withdrew funds en masse from risky prime funds (a major holder of commercial paper) and, in aggregate, reallocated their investments into safer funds holding mainly US government securities and repurchase agreements. Retail investors also withdrew from risky funds, but on a somewhat smaller scale than institutional investors. Cross-sectional regressions suggest that funds most heavily invested in risky assets, such as commercial paper, faced the largest outflows. Figure 1 graphs the evolution of total net assets (TNA) in the mutual fund business over time. The figure separates the data into four groups, based on the fund's main asset class and investor type: prime-institutional; prime-retail; government-institutional; and government-retail.
The figure shows, first, that institutional investors dominate TNA and aggregate flows in the industry. Second, the figure shows a dramatic reallocation of total investment from the prime (risky) to the government (safe) funds. Figure 2 shows the percentage change in TNA during the days surrounding the Lehman collapse: just before (Sept. 9-12), during and after , again separated by clientele and investment strategy. We focus on how funds adjusted their positions in response to these large flows. In general, funds facing liquidity pressure can minimize short-run costs by first using cash from maturing assets to pay claims, second by selling their most liquid (and safe) non-maturing assets before selling less liquid (and less safe) assets. Since such a strategy leaves the fund holding riskier and less liquid assets than before the shock, however, long-run stability could be jeopardized by continued outflows. Hence, a fund facing outflows that it fears may continue could instead opt to sell some of its less liquid positions to maintain a liquidity buffer to insure against continued outflows. We find strong evidence consistent with the first strategy. This behavior likely reflects, first, the reality that selling risky holdings such as commercial paper became all but impossible in the days following the Lehman bankruptcy. Most potential buyers would have been other prime funds, who themselves faced liquidity pressures. Second, the rapid initiation of government protection provided to investors obviated concerns about long-run viability for liquidity-stressed funds. The US Treasury provided an ex-post, across-the-board guarantee against breaking the buck for all money market funds on September 19, 2008 (excluding the Reserve Primary Fund, which had already broken the buck). As should be clear from Figure 2 , this policy action stopped the run after just four days. The Treasury program was available to all money funds for one basis point per dollar of net asset value. We find that funds more exposed to outflows and holding a greater share of high-risk, high-yield assets were more likely to enter the program.
We then test whether mutual funds made long-run changes to their portfolio allocations after the crisis. We focus on Prime funds because these faced the greatest outflows during the crisis. Prime funds hardest hit by the runs -those initially holding relatively riskier and longermaturity assets and those facing the largest cash withdrawals -reduced risk relative to other prime funds by the end of 2008. These hard-hit funds increased their holding of safe assets and shortened the weighted-average maturity of their holdings. We find that the move toward safer assets persists up to two years after the Lehman collapse. We also compare these long-run changes to similar cases of illiquidity observed prior to 2008. During the earlier period, illiquidity occurred idiosyncratically rather than clustering around a systemic event like
Lehman's collapse. Our results suggest that funds shorten maturity after idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, but they do not alter their relative weight in risky assets.
Our findings suggest that reasonable concerns about moral hazard effects of government bailouts on risk-taking incentives may not be justified, at least in this setting. The Treasury bailout had differential effects across the mutual fund industry, with the greatest benefits accruing to funds that had the most risk pre-crisis, since these funds suffered the highest outflows during the crisis. Rather than increase risk, as standard moral hazard arguments would predict, we find that these 'bailed out' funds reduced their risk relative to other funds. We also test whether funds that actually purchased Treasury protection changed their risk profile over the subsequent months but find little robust evidence that they did. Thus, our results do not support the idea that the Treasury Guarantee, to the extent that it embedded expectations of future guarantees, led money market fund managers to increase risk.
Our paper contributes to a small literature on the causes and consequences of the run on the money market industry after Lehman's failure.
1 McCabe (2010) shows that runs were 'rational' in that they were concentrated at high-risk funds, using reasonable measures of investment risk and the likelihood of sponsor support. Similarly, Wermers (2010) finds that runs were more pronounced among institutional investors, with such investors tending to move their money from a prime (risky) fund to a government fund (safe), often within the same family.
Most recently, Chernenko and Sunderam (2011) show that institutional investors again fled risk associated with money funds' exposure to European banks during the summer of 2011, when concerns about sovereign risk peaked.
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2012) study pre-crisis risk taking by money funds. They describe the behavior of the Reserve Primary Fund, which expanded its investment into highrisk, high yield assets (e.g. asset-backed commercial paper) very aggressively during the run-up to Lehman and, as a result, were able to induce huge investor inflows (due to high yields). They find a similar pattern across other funds which, like the Reserve Primary Fund, were not sponsored by financial conglomerates. Funds owned by large financial institutions with substantial non-fund business, on the other hand, did not plunge into risky investments, 1 Qian and Tanyeri (2011) and Chen et. al. (2010) analyze the potential for runs in equity mutual funds prior to Lehman. Qian and Tanyeri (2011) analyze flows and returns to equity funds under investigation for market timing and late trading in 2003 and show how fire-sale costs might provide incentives for early withdrawal. Chen et.al.
(2010) investigate how incentives for early withdrawal might be amplified in equity funds with illiquid investments.
suggesting that sponsor 'skin in the game,' in the form of reputational capital at risk, can mitigate risk-taking incentives by money-fund managers. Our paper complements theirs by documenting that this risk-taking behavior seems to have reversed following the Lehman collapse. Risky funds hit hard by the crisis reallocated their investments away from risk and toward liquidity between the Lehman collapse and the end of 2008, reversing the run-up in risk behavior prior to the crisis.
The next section briefly describes the evolution of the money market fund industry leading up to the 2008 crisis. Section III then describes our data, methods and results. Section IV contains a short conclusion.
II. Industry Description
Money market mutual funds originated during the high-interest rate environment of the 1970s. Checkable money market mutual funds such as the Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account demonstrated to savers that banking by mail and telephone could provide a convenient alternative to branch-based deposits. Moreover, in the 1970s commercial banks faced limits on their ability to pay interest on deposits; such regulations did not constrain money market funds.
By offering stable but liquid claims with limited check-writing features, these accounts provided a close substitute for bank deposits. The competitive advantage of money market accounts grew dramatically during the latter part of the 1970s because short-term interest rates soared to nearly 20%. With bank deposit rates constrained by regulation, funds flowed from banks to money market accounts; this disintermediation induced banks to support deregulation of restrictions on interest rates payable on deposits. Thus, from zero in 1970, money market mutual funds grew to roughly one third the size of deposits held at banks by the 1980s (Kroszner and Strahan (2006) ).
In the 1990s and 2000s, money market funds became a major supplier of savings to support the shadow banking system (Gorton and Metrick (2010); Krishnamurthy et. al. (2012) ). Money funds became major buyers of asset-backed commercial paper, thereby financing securitized assets that had formerly been held on the balance sheets of traditional banks (Acharya et. al. (2010) ). Money market funds also began to supply large-scale funds to lightly regulated investment banks in the repurchase-agreement market that these institutions in turn used to finance their holdings of securitized assets. Between 1990 and 2007, for example, assets held by investment banks rose from 5% to 25% of assets held by commercial banks, and 50% of those assets were financed in the repo market using funds held in money market accounts (Gorton and Metrick (2010) ). Thus, much of the asset-transformation that occurred on the balance sheets of heavily regulated commercial banks moved to the lessregulated shadow banking system, with money market funds playing the deposit-taking role and investment banks and ABCP conduits playing the lending role (by holding securitized assets).
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Despite its rapid expansion and growing importance as a source of savings to the financial system, the money market business enjoyed a track record of stability and safety until 2008. Money market funds are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under rule 2a-7, which limits their credit-risk and liquidity-risk exposures. Money funds, for example, may not purchase assets with maturity greater than 13 months, they must not have a weighted-average maturity greater than 60 days, and they must hold mainly highly rated instruments such as commercial paper, repurchase agreements and US government securities.
Moreover, many money market funds are sponsored by large financial institutions which have, in a few cases prior to 2008, stepped in to support their funds rather than allow investors to experience losses of principal (McCabe (2010) ). Brady et. al. (2012) systematically study parent firm non-contractual support (in the form of a cash contribution or a purchase of fund securities at above market prices) to their money market funds from 2007 to 2011. They find more than 100 instances of such support, although in most cases the infusions of capital are very small (< 0.5% of assets).
The money market funds aim to maintain a stable net asset value, paying a periodic return to investors much as banks pay interest to depositors. The industry is segmented into four groups based on clientele (retail v. institutional) and based on portfolio risk (government funds v.
prime funds). Retail funds serve small investors. Institutional funds serve the needs of corporations, governments, and other large pooled investment vehicles. Typically institutional funds require large minimum balances but come with lower fees than retail funds. Government funds hold mainly US government securities and repurchase agreements, whereas prime funds hold mainly commercial paper and unsecured short-term claims issued by financial institutions (mainly banks). Despite the safety and short maturity of their assets, the market value of claims can vary; hence, money market funds are required to disclose losses to investors that exceed 0.5%. Such events, known as 'breaking the buck', were rare until the 2008 financial crisis.
Perception about money fund safety, however, shifted dramatically after the Lehman bankruptcy when the Reserve Primary Fund announced that it had incurred losses on its large holdings of Lehman-issued commercial paper. This announcement triggered a run concentrated among prime funds catering to institutional investors (recall Figure 1) . Below we explore crosssectional patterns in these outflows.
The reallocation of fund investments out of the prime segment severely constrained the functioning of the commercial paper market because these money market funds had been the Together these government programs halted the run on money market funds and restored liquidity to the commercial paper market (Duygan-Bump et.al. (2010) ). 5 In fact, Figure 1 shows that funds began flowing from the government sector back into the prime sector shortly after 3 See http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourself/investoralerts/mutualfunds/p117136.
Treasury's announcement. Commercial paper outstanding follows a similar pattern over time, with a sharp drop in CP issued by financial companies just after Lehman, and a subsequent gradual recovery over the subsequent months (Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010) ).
III. Data, Empirical Methods, and Results

A. Data
We compile the sample of taxable money market mutual funds using iMoneyNet database. iMoneyNet provides data on share-level and master-level funds. A master-level fund can have many types of shares with different expense structures and a common investment portfolio. For example, the same portfolio may have an institutional share class and a retail share class. Because we are interested in how fund managers adjust the portfolio in response to a large liquidity shock, we focus on the master-level funds rather than share-level funds. 6 Funds at the master level are defined as either retail or institutional in their prospectus, although some funds offer both share classes. In our sample, most funds defined as institutional have the vast majority of TNA in the institutional share class category (with an average of 85%), and for funds defined as retail the majority of TNA are in retail share classes (with an average of 99%). Each masterlevel fund is used only once in our regressions. We collect data on total net assets (TNA, reported on a daily basis), portfolio composition (reported on a weekly basis as of each Tuesday), and fund characteristics. The data show that the government funds invest mainly in safe assets such as government securities and repurchase agreements, whereas prime funds invest mainly in riskier assets, such commercial paper and non-deposit bank obligations. These portfolio differences are reflected in yields, which are consistently higher in the prime funds. The yield differentials are greatest during the period between 2007 and 2008, reflecting increased risk premiums during the subprime crisis and the ensuing financial crisis. We see very little difference in yields between retail and institutional money market funds, although in the government sector the institutional funds invest more in repurchase agreements, which allows them to operate with lower weightedaverage maturity. The most striking change over time is the decline in risk and shortening of maturity in the prime segment relative to the government segment at the end of 2008. This aggregate shift makes sense because these funds were hardest hit by the liquidity shock following Lehman's collapse. And, as we will show, the same patterns emerge in the cross section of funds, meaning that funds hardest hit by the post-Lehman runs reduced risk and shortened maturity the most.
B. Measuring Money-Market Liquidity Shocks
We want to estimate how money market funds respond to liquidity shocks, and contrast their behavior following idiosyncratic shocks (e.g. instances of cash redemption demands prior to the Lehman collapse) with their responses to systemic liquidity shocks that occurred in the days after Lehman's fall. Most outflows can be met using cash from maturing assets because money market funds hold short-term assets with an average dollar-weighted maturity of about 40 days (recall Table 1 ). In other words, each week nearly 20% of total net assets mature for the typical fund. Very large outflows, however, may overwhelm a fund's ability to meet withdrawal demands with maturing assets, thereby forcing the fund to sell non-maturing assets. Thus, we are interested in measuring the effects of two variables related to flow, one simply measuring the fraction of investment lost and the other measuring the degree to which the fund is forced to sell assets. Hence, we define Outflow and Illiquidity as follows (with fund-level subscripts temporarily suppressed):
Outflow simply measures a fund's net loss (gain if negative) of investment during a k-day interval from t to t+k. (Adjusting for the portfolio return in our case has a tiny impact on the flow measure because the typical yield over a two-week period is roughly 10 basis points.) We Illiquidity measures the fraction of a fund's assets that must be sold to meet redemption demands during the k-day interval. Illiquidity equals zero during most intervals because outflows tend to be small relative to asset maturity. During the days after Lehman's collapse, however, 27 money market funds could only meet redemptions by selling assets.
Our data allow us to observe total net assets each day, so we can measure precisely the loss of assets that occurred between the Lehman collapse and the Treasury Guarantee announcement (September 15-19, 2008 ). As Figure 2 shows, the outflows dropped sharply immediately following this announcement. Between September 15 and the 19 th , for example, the prime-institutional fund category in aggregate lost almost $300 billion; during September 22 and 23 rd , the Monday and Tuesday of the following week, these outflows dropped to less than $20 billion. Thus, the run effectively was stanched by the US Treasury's commitment to backstop all existing investments. We are only able to measure fund portfolio characteristics (such as maturing assets) each Tuesday, however; so we can measure holdings on Tuesday, September 9
(pre-run), on Tuesday, September 16 (mid-run) and on Tuesday, September 23 (post-run). Due to this data constraint, we are not able to estimate perfectly the outcomes of interest, namely portfolio allocation and maturity measures timed to match the exact days of the post-Lehman run. Instead, we estimate both Outflow and Illiquidity over the two-week interval that overlaps the run, beginning a few days before its onset (September 9) and ending a few days after its end (September 23, 2008) . So, for each fund i, we build the following flow measures: and also for the single cross-section around the Lehman collapse. Money market fund flows are highly variable over short intervals of time, with a mean Outflow of -0.7% (i.e., a +0.7% inflow)
overall in the full sample and a standard deviation of almost 9% over two-week horizons.
Outflows over short intervals are very common, with Outflow positive about 47% of the time (Panel A). During the post-Lehman days, however, outflows were large enough to overwhelm many funds' ability to meet withdrawal demands with maturing assets. Outflow averages about -7 Asset maturity is not measured correctly in our data for floating-rate notes. Since a few funds hold a large fraction of this asset class, we have estimated our main models in Tables 4 and 7 without them and find similar results; we have also controlled explicitly in our regressions for the share of assets held in floating-rate notes and again find similar results, both in terms of magnitudes and statistical significance.
2% during the two-weeks surrounding Lehman with a standard deviation of 24% (Panel B); for Prime funds, outflow averages more than 7% (Panel C). The high cross-sectional variation in
Outflow reflects the drastic reallocation of investments across fund types, where money flew out of high-risk prime funds and into low-risk government funds (recall Figure 1 ). Table 2 also shows that Illiquidity was much higher during the Lehman weeks than during the earlier weeks, with a mean of 1%. During these two weeks 27 funds, which prior to Lehman controlled 15 percent of industry assets, had positive Illiquidity, meaning that sales of assets were necessary to meet redemptions. For these funds, the typical one had to sell more than 16% of its assets to meet redemptions.
/*** Insert Table 2 about here***/ As shown in Panel C, 24 of the 27 funds with positive Illiquidity were Prime funds; thus we focus our attention below on this segment of the money fund industry below. The Lehman interval is the only two-week period in our sample where more than five funds experienced outflows large enough to require asset sales. Hence, we consider the earlier instances of Illiquidity as being idiosyncratic rather than systemic.
C. Outflow during the Crisis
McCabe (2010) In (1a), all right-hand-side variables are measured as of t, so they are predetermined with respect to the dependent variable.
We report equation (1a) The control variables in these equations include the weighted average maturity, an indicator for bank-sponsored funds, the log of lagged total net assets, total expenses per dollar of average assets, and the log of the lag of the total assets of the fund family. We also include a government-fund indicator variable, which in itself will absorb a substantial amount of the variation in Risky share across the sample. In the panel regressions, we cluster by fund in building standard errors to account for an unobserved fund-level heterogeneity that may create correlated errors across observations within the same fund.
8 Table 3 reports the flow regression estimates. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report the crosssectional regressions using just the bi-weekly period surrounding Lehman's collapse. The other columns report the panel regressions.
/*** Insert Table 3 about here***/ These flow regressions strongly suggest that during the post-Lehman days investors fled risk. This finding is strong for both investor types, although magnitudes are larger for institutional investors. In the full sample, the Risky share coefficient is not significant but both the Government indicator and Gross yield coefficients enter the model significantly, indicating the high-risk, high-return investments were associated with outflows (column 1). To understand the magnitude, consider comparing a typical prime fund (with Risky share = 80%; Gross yield = 2.7%) to a typical government fund (with Risky share = 10%; Gross yield = 2.2%). Based on the coefficients from column 1, the prime find would face outflows of about 25% of TNA relative to the government fund (=0.00*(80-10) + 24.40*(2.7-2.2) + 12.43). This magnitude is very similar to what we observe in the panel regressions, using the interaction terms (column 2).
When we split the sample based on customer type (Table 3 , columns 3-6), we find similar effects of Gross yield for both types of investors; for retail investors, however, Government indicator has a smaller impact on flow. Combining the effects of the risk variables, the overall 8 We have also estimated similar models without the Government indicator and its interactions with the Crisis indicator. In these models, Risky share is much more important statistically because most of the variation in risky assets comes across investment-style categories rather than across funds within the same style category.
effect of risk on flow is greater for the institutional investor class, although both share classes do flee risk. Consider again comparing the typical prime fund with the typical government fund.
For institutional investors, the cross-sectional model (column 3) predicts outflow of 32% for the prime funds relative to government (= 0.13*(80-10) + 18.62*(2.7-2.2) + 13.60); for retail investors, the cross-sectional model (column 5) predicts a relative outflow of just 16% (= -0.04*(80-10) + 24.52*(2.7-2.2) + 6.31). The panel models have similar effects, again based on the interactive coefficients. The direct effects suggest that during normal market conditions gross yield is negatively associated with outflow, reflecting a sensible flow-performance link.
D. Short-run responses: Changes in Portfolio Allocation and the Treasury Guarantee Program
The flow results establish what earlier researchers have found, namely that institutional investors responded very dramatically to the crisis by pulling money away from high risk funds and toward low-risk funds. What is less appreciated but also true: retail investors responded similarly, albeit less dramatically (with smaller magnitudes in the cross section).
We focus on how this liquidity shock affected money market fund managers. How did fund managers respond to the outflows? In this sub-section we explore, first, short-run portfolio changes and, second, the decision as to whether or not to enter the Treasury Guarantee Program.
As noted above, this program insured all fund investments invested as of September 19, 2008, provided that the fund itself entered the program for a fee of 1 basis point per dollar of insured. We model short-run portfolio adjustments at bi-weekly frequency because the key event in our dataset -the post-Lehman run -straddles two weeks, yet we only observe portfolio attributes at weekly frequency (Tuesday to Tuesday).
As another dimension of non-portfolio-related adjustments to the liquidity shock, we estimate a Probit model where the dependent variable equals one if a fund decides to enter the Treasury Guarantee program, on the same set of explanatory variables. This model allows us to test whether riskier funds and funds more affected by the liquidity shock were more likely to buy government insurance. In our final set of tests below (next sub-section), we test for moral hazard effects of the program by estimating how portfolio weights and investment choices change over the longer run, conditional on entering the Treasury Guarantee Program. Tables 4 and 5 report the cross-sectional and panel estimates (equations 2a and 2b, respectively), and Table 6 reports the estimates regarding the decision to enter the Treasury Guarantee Program. Since the prime funds faced the bulk of the liquidity risk, we estimate these models for prime funds only. Table 4 shows that money funds hit by large outflows responded by using maturing assets to meet cash demands and, when necessary, by selling their most liquid claims. As a result, the liquidity shock led such funds to be stuck holding high-risk assets such as commercial paper.
In Table 4 , columns 1 & 2, both Illiquidity and Outflow are positively related to ΔRisky share,
with Outflow entering at better than 1% significance. Liquidity pressure (Outflow) also led to short-run declines in repurchase agreements (a component of the safe category), which also tend to have the shortest average maturity of money market fund holdings, thus leading to an increase in weighted-average maturity (columns 3 & 4). The magnitude suggests that a standard deviation increase in outflow (σ = 17 -recall Table 2 ) was associated with an increase in risky assets of 2.4% of TNA (=0.14*17). Maturity also increases substantially; a standard deviation increase in outflow was associated with an increase in maturity of nearly 3 days (=0.17*17).
/*** Insert Table 4 about here***/ Table 5 offers a broader perspective on the first set of results by allowing us to compare how funds respond to systemic liquidity shocks (after the fall of Lehman) with idiosyncratic liquidity shocks that had occurred earlier. 10 The first set of coefficients reflects the typical response to illiquidity, whereas the second set of interaction terms reflects the differential effect of illiquidity (and other effects) during the post-Lehman panic. We see stark differences for variation in risky assets (but not for maturity) in the prime fund segment. Under normal market conditions, funds that face outflows use maturing assets for cash; this behavior increases weighted-average maturity. The relative weight on the other asset classes -classes with longer maturity -increases, leading to higher weighted-average maturity. However, under liquidity stress such that our Illiquidity variable is non-zero, prior to Lehman money market funds would sell risky assets such as commercial paper to meet demands. These declines in risky assets (e.g., commercial paper) suggest that prior to Lehman such assets can be sold with little market impact to meet cash demands. In contrast, following the Lehman collapse, risky asset classes are difficult-to-impossible to sell without facing large losses; hence, the interaction of Illiquidity with the Crisis indicator is positive and significant. /*** Insert Table 5 about here***/
The differential effect of Illiquidity on investments in ΔRisky share highlights the truly unique aspects of the post-Lehman run on the money market funds. Our results imply that only 10 Although we cannot determine why every money market fund faced illiquidity, about one-quarter of the cases of funds that faced pre-Lehman illiquidity were very small and simply overwhelmed by large outflows. In some other cases for large funds, shocks to the sponsor's reputation seem to have generated large outflows. For example, a Legg-Mason owned money market fund experienced a large outflow when another (equity) fund sponsored by Legg
Mason incurred large losses in a single day due to a large exposure to Google. In another case, a money market fund sponsored by Oppenheimer faced large outflows when the firm and its CEO were named in a suit by the NASD.
those funds that faced outflows large enough to overwhelm incoming cash from maturing assets behaved differently with respect to withdrawal demands than funds do under normal conditionsthe interaction of the Lehman indicator with Outflow is not statistically significant. The effect of Illiquidity on the ΔRisky share, however, is statistically significantly larger during the crisis.
Outflow shows no difference relative to its effects on risk or maturity following idiosyncratic shocks. This makes sense because the systemic nature of the event made it difficult to sell risky paper, thus forcing these funds to allow the relative weight of risky assets to increase beyond what would normally be tolerable. ΔMaturity, however, does not respond differentially to either
Outflow or Illiquidity during the crisis, probably because funds always use incoming cash to meet redemptions, regardless of market circumstances. What differs in the crisis is that the sale of assets such as commercial paper becomes nearly impossible.
According to Table 6 , mutual funds with greater risk (prime funds) and higher gross yield were more apt to enter the Treasury Guarantee Program. Table 6 reports marginal effects, so the coefficients suggest that a government fund was 24% less likely to enter the program and a 50 basis point yield differential would lead to another 22.5% difference. These large magnitudes make sense, as 91% of the prime funds entered the program, as opposed to 41% for the government funds. When we split the sample, Gross Yield continues to play a significant role for the government funds (not reported for the government sample). For both groups, we find that bank ownership is positively associated with entering the Guarantee Program.
/*** Insert Table 6 about here***/
E. Long-Run Portfolio Adjustments
In the Lehman crisis, severely stressed funds added risk in its immediate aftermath because market liquidity dried up, forcing them to hold assets that they normally would have sold to meet redemptions. Moreover, high-risk funds were more likely to enter the Treasury Guarantee program than low-risk funds, and they also benefited most from this program because, in its absence, such funds would have been forced to close or halt redemptions. These facts raise the following question: how did such funds respond once market conditions returned to normal?
Standard moral hazard arguments might suggest that funds would add risk to exploit expectations of continued Treasury support, particularly because high risk funds had gained market share in the months leading up to the Lehman collapse. Yet these funds faced a neardeath experience. Managerial concerns about long-run stability of their position could offset risk-taking concerns associated with newly embedded bailout expectations.
In our last set of tests, we address these issues by estimating whether the effects of the Lehman liquidity shock had a permanent effect on portfolio allocation decisions. We first extend the time in constructing portfolio change variables to the end of 2008 in building the dependent variable in equation (2a). To do so, we leave constant the right-hand side variables, as well as the sample, but we adjust the dependent variable to reflect a three-month adjustment period for the portfolio, to the end of the year. Thus, we replace the dependent variable in equation (2a), which represented two-week changes beginning on September 9, with changes in risky assets (and changes in maturity) from September 9, 2008 to the end of 2008 (a three-month change).
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Some of the explanatory variables in our short-run regressions -the ex ante levels of risky share, maturity and even gross yield -capture dimensions of fund risk that both contributed to the liquidity shock (recall Table 3 ) and also go beyond liquidity (by capturing credit risk, for example). We control for the beginning-of-period levels of these variables in the short-run analysis (Tables 4 & 5) , but their effects are small and generally not statistically significant. We continue to include these additional dimensions of risk in the long-run regressions. By including them, we can test whether fund managers changed their portfolio decisions in reaction to risk dimensions that go beyond the post-Lehman liquidity shock but nevertheless could increase the likelihood of future liquidity risk. More generally, if investors shun risk after Lehman, a 'flight to quality' might lead money market fund managers with high-risk portfolios to move most aggressively toward safe assets. 12 We have also tested whether the gross yield declines more at funds that faced large outflows as an alternative measure of risk taking. These results are consistent with those for the change in risky share and change in maturity reported in Table 7 : both Illiquidity and Outflow enter the model with negative coefficients, with the coefficient of Illiquidity significant at 5% level and Outflow insignificant. When we test the joint significance of the two, the F-statistic equals 4.38, significant at the 5% level.
/*** Insert Table 7 about here***/
The results suggest that funds 'burned' during the crisis -high risk funds and funds with insufficient liquidity to meet withdrawal demands without selling assets -responded over the longer run by lowering asset risk and shortening maturity. The increase in portfolio risk for illiquid funds in the immediate aftermath of Lehman is more than fully reversed, such that by the end of the year the most-affected funds had reduced risk relative to those less affected (compared to their risk levels before the Lehman shock). Our Illiquidity variable, which again measures the fraction of assets that had to be sold, is negatively related to both ΔRisky share (columns 1- 4) and ΔMaturity (columns 5-8). The magnitudes are large and economically significant. For example, the typical illiquid prime fund had to sell about 13% of its assets to meet withdrawals (recall Table 2 ). This degree of illiquidity was associated with a decrease in risky asset of 8% (= -0.59*13, from column 1) of assets by the end of 2008. And, these funds shortened average maturity by 8 days (= -0.62*13, from column 5), relative to the average of around 40 days.
These effects are smaller when we control for Risky share, Maturity and Gross yield, which makes sense because the high-risk funds were more likely to face large outflows (so adding these absorbs some of the liquidity effects). Figure 3 illustrates perhaps the simplest way to digest the combined results of our shortand long-run analysis. Among the prime funds not hit hard by outflows (those with Illiquidity = 0), risky assets fell by 3.2% on average during the run (from September 9 to September 23) and fell an additional 2.7% of net assets by the end of the year. In contrast, among prime funds hit hard by outflows (those with Illiquidity > 0), risky assets rose by 6.0% during the run (because they were forced to sell non-maturing, safe assets), but then fell by 14.5% of assets by year-end, leading to a net drop in risk of 8.5(=6.0% -14.5%) relative to their position on the eve of the run.
Comparing changes from the end of the run to the end of the year is striking: illiquid funds cut risk by 14.5%, relative to just 2.7% for liquid funds.
/*** Insert Figure 3 about here***/ Table 7 offers little evidence that the Treasury Guarantee program affected fund asset allocation decisions or incentived risk taking, as moral hazard arguments would predict. The indicator never enters the ΔRisky assets regression with a statistically significant coefficient (and its sign flips depending on the model). In the ΔMaturity model, the indicator has a positive effect in two of the four specifications. Together with the fact that funds that benefited most from the Government bailout -funds facing the largest outflows -reduced risk over the subsequent three months, this evidence provides little support for the idea that the Treasury Guarantee encouraged excessive risk taking by money market fund managers. Table 8 extends the time for portfolio adjustment from the 3-month horizon to 1-year and to 2-year horizons. As in Table 7 , we leave the explanatory variables at their pre-Lehman levels and alter only the time window to build the dependent variables, ΔRisky share and ΔMaturity.
The results suggest that the portfolio changes that occurred during the first 3 months after the crisis persist. Illiquidity, Risky share and Maturity all continue to enter the regressions with negative coefficients. The coefficients are less statistically significant generally, which is not that surprising given the long time lag, although the effect of Risky share (again, measured before the Lehman crash) on ΔRisky share increases in both its magnitude and statistical significance when we extend the horizon out to two years. This larger magnitude may reflect tougher SEC regulations of money market fund investments that were implemented in the summer of 2010.
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In our final test, we compare how funds affected by systemic liquidity shocks (i.e. the 27 funds forced to sell assets after Lehman) adjust their portfolios, relative to funds hit by similarsized but idiosyncratic liquidity shocks using a non-parametric empirical matched-sample comparison.
14 We first identify a sample of funds hit by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks using
The sample also falls as we lengthen the time horizon because some funds drop out of the dataset. For the short run regressions in Table 4 , we have 247 prime funds; of these 237 survive to the end of 2008, 214 to the third quarter of 2009 and 191 to the third quarter of 2010. That said, the survivorship is not strongly correlated with the liquidity shock. For example, about 6.2% of the total sample faced positive illiquidity during the Lehman collapse;
by the end of 2010, the share of surviving funds that had faced positive illiquidity was 5.7% of the total sample.
14 Regressions would be awkward to design consistently because the pre-Lehman liquidity events are short lived and spread out sporadically over time.
funds that experienced a positive value for Illiquidity at some point prior to 2008. There are 42 such cases, 40 of which survive in our dataset for the subsequent three months. 15 We then stratify these data into 20 Illiquidity bins, based on the distribution of Illiquidity for the 27 postLehman cases of illiquidity. For each of these 27 funds (the 'treatment group'), we find a mutual fund in the same Illiquidity bin with the closest TNA (the 'control' group). Based on this matching procedure, the average illiquid fund in the treatment group had to sell 16 percent of its portfolio and their TNA prior to Lehman's collapse was $16 billion. The average Illiquidity in the control sample was also 16 percent of the portfolio, but their TNA prior to the liquidity shock was $2 billion. Hence, we are not able to match perfectly based on size. Table 9 compares average three-month changes in risky asset holdings and changes in weighted-average maturity for the treatment group with two 'control groups': all funds that faced illiquidity events (i.e. had positive values for Illiquidity) priod to 2008 (n=40) and the matched sample described above (n=23). 16 We find, consistent with the regressions in Table 7 , that firms hit by illiquidity after Lehman both reduced their risky asset portfolio weight (by 8.6% of TNA on average) and shortened asset maturity (by 13 days). For both sets of control firms, however, we find an increase rather than a decrease in risky asset holding, with a statistically significant difference between the mean change in the two samples. In contrast, we find no difference in 15 Table 2 reports 85 funds having faced illiquidity events: 42 of these occurred before 2008, 16 occurred during the first 8 months of 2008 (before Lehman), and 27 occurred during the two weeks after Lehman's bankruptcy. 16 Four funds in the treatment group drop out of the sample by December 2008, so we have 23 observations in both treatment and control in the matched-sample approach. maturity adjustments. All of the funds seem to react to liquidity shocks, either systemic (postLehman) or idiosyncratic (pre-Lehman) by shortening maturity.
/*** Insert Table 9 about here***/
F. Why did Money Market Funds Reduce Risk?
We have found that money market mutual fund managers responded to the post-Lehman run by moving toward safer investments. In aggegate, prime retail money market funds cut their risky share from 76% to 67% from the eve of Lehman's collpase to the end of 2010; prime institutional funds cut back risk even more, from 82% to 69% (Table 1) . The cross-sectional regression show that these changes were greatest among ex ante riskier funds and among funds hardest hit by outflows. Some of the changes likely occured in response to tighter SEC regulations finalized in the middle of 2010 that required money market funds to hold more liquid and higher-credit-quality assets. But much of the adjustments, both in aggregate as well as in our cross sectional analysis, occured within three months of the Lehman bankruptcy, well before SEC regulations came into effect. This behavior reversed the risk taking that occured during the run-up to the crash. It may reflect investor preferences (flight to quality) or managerial preferences (career concerns) for safety, or some combination of the two. For example, managers of high-risk funds faced a near death experience in late September 2008 and watched as the oldest and one of the largest funds collapsed (the Reserve Primary Fund). The Treasury Guarantee program itself was designed to prevent an extension of the safety net beyond preexisting money market accounts -new investments were not covered -so money fund managers may also have been catering to new investors' desire for high-liquidity, low-risk investments.
IV. Conclusion
We study how money market mutual funds weathered systemic runs that occured after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008. In the immediate aftermath, funds facing outflows large enough to overwhelm cash resources available from maturing assets resorted to selling their most liquid holdings. As a result, these funds found themselves holding higher risk and longer maturity assets than desired. Over the subsequent quarters, the funds hit hardest 8.00%
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